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After eight years of the United Nations (UN) administration, Kosovo again is 
returned to the international centre of attention – this time about her future 
political status. The document presented by the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, 
Martti Ahtisaari, proposed an ambiguous status settlement that is portrayed and 
understood as a “supervised independence”. Whatever expectations from 
political perspective will be, that is of secondary importance for this paper – the 
aim is in Kosovo’s aggregate uncertainty about her economic sustainability, 
namely to investigate the relationship between fragile institutions, poor 
governance and weak economic performance. With a foreign aid since the 
second half of 1999 amounting to €22 billion, Kosovo still has massive 
unemployment and widespread poverty. How the UN’s largest experiment ever 
undertaken, involving considerable resources and long time, left the economy in 
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Forgotten Status of Many: Kosovo’s 






Kosovo is a landlocked country in the Western Balkans with an estimated 
population of 2.1 million inhabitants in an area of 10,887 km
2. Over 60% of the 
population lives in rural areas and around 1/3 is younger than 15 years old 
(Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2006). On 10 June, 1999 the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) passed the Resolution 1244 authorizing the establishment of the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
1 The deployment of UNMIK marked the 
beginning of transition to democracy and market economy that was delayed for a 
decade. While most countries in transition reformed their institutions, Kosovo 
needed to build them from scratches. This task was taken in charge by UNMIK 
which, in its first regulation On the Authority of the Interim Administration in 
Kosovo (Regulation No. 1999/1, amended by Regulation No. 1999/25 and 




Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISGs) are democratically elected 
institutions in charge of managing Kosovo’s affairs under the supervision of 
UNMIK. They include institutions such as the Assembly of 120 members that 
elects the President of Kosovo. The President then nominates the PM that has to 
be endorsed by the Assembly. Following the approval of the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo marked the beginning of 
gradual transfer of powers from UNMIK to the PISGs. The transfer of power is 
                                                 
1 The full text of this resolution is available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement  
2 Official Gazette of UNMIK and all its regulations can be accessed at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/Econtents.htm    4
not full and a number of key decision-making areas are earmarked as the 
“reserved power” for SRSG, whose authority is derived from the UN Resolution 
1244. Beside unlimited power to overrule every political decision of the PISGs, a 
long list of competencies falling in the reserved power for SRSG as laid down in 
section 8 of the Framework includes the following economic areas: approval of 
the Kosovo budget; monetary policy; controlling the UNMIK’s customs service; 
administration of social, state, and public property; appointing of members in 
economic and fiscal council; appointing of tax inspectors, etc.
3 
 
UNMIK and the PISGs are a set of institutions whose behavior is very similar to 
the one observed in early capitalist development in Western Europe centuries 
ago.  Group and individual interests within the PISGs do not differ from illegal, 
what Marxists would call, accumulation of capital at the expense of others. The 
only difference is that accumulation of capital does not occur through violent 
means but instruments such as power and position.  History and the experience 
from transition in CEE suggests that the road to enrichment of a social class to 
the extent that they feel fed enough then began to share their wealth with the rest 
of the population, maybe costly and with problems. 
 
The PISGs repeatedly maintain that pending political status was and is still the 
main barrier to economic development, assuming that once that is sorted out, the 
economy will prosper. This paper shows that an overemphasis by politicians on 
externalities such as the unresolved political status (which certainly is a 
roadblock) while underestimating their management inefficiency associated with 
corruption, is a pettifogger explanation that impoverished population has started 
(with a delay) to get rid of its consumption. Now that rotation in power has 
included all main political parties, the general public doubts if current political 
establishment will ever run Kosovo honestly and efficiently. To this vicious circle 
it has come as a result of clientelism between Kosovo’s politicians and some UN 
bureaucrats with the loyalty of the first towards the latter, both pursuing own 
interests that were and are not necessarily part of their work or mission. 
                                                 
3 Provisions of UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9, amended by Regulation 2002/9.    5
By not having an exit strategy, the mission of UNMIK is only formally drawing at 
an end. Having realized that Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) that have a designated scope of operation, are not sufficiently capable of 
ruling independently, it is expected that an EU mission will support an outspoken 
“supervised independence”. The EU was principally in charge of managing 
Kosovo’s reconstruction and economic development under UNMIK, and now is 
drawing plans for a greater role in what is expected to be the EU’s largest 
mission so far.  
 
The interplay between UNMIK and the PISGs in economic development is an 
interesting case for research as an alternative in transition economics. To find 
this out, in section one of this paper I first consider a theory of the role of 
institutions in economic performance. It starts with a brief discussion on limited 
role of institutions from classical economics point of view, and then it expands to 
their greater importance in transition economies. Since major decisions in the 
economy are still made by UNMIK, section two will explore the magnitude of this 
power exercise and the mission of its EU Pillar IV is discussed in subsequent 
sub-section. The impact and constraints of pending political status in economic 
development is discussed in section three. Rhetoric towards political status has 
distracted the attention from miserable economic status – the indicators of which 
are presented in section four. Unemployment and poverty are not the only 
statuses that did not receive serious attention. There are other areas not related 
to political status at all and where performance is disappointing, especially in 
education and health. These are named and described in a sub-section as 
Kosovo’s other forgotten statuses. Section five tries to answer the question if the 
UN’s interim mission is turning permanent, or explaining the proposed resolution 
of political status. The last section draws conclusions and offers some lessons to 
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1.  Theoretical background on the role of institutions in economic 
performance 
Classical economics, its main architect Adam Smith respectively, advocated for a 
role of the government outside the economy. Smith’s arguments on laissez-faire 
or liberal economic policies that the government is better placed to collect taxes, 
provide peace and security, and protect private property rights rather than 
interfere in the markets that should be left to operate freely, dominated the 
economic thought in the 19
th century. It was not until the Great Depression 1929-
1923 in the capitalist world, the rise of the Soviet Union as a socialist country and 
foundation of Keynesian economics where, free market economics would fall out 
of popularity and superseded by the government control of economy in the 
former socialist countries and significant state intervention in capitalist countries 
after World War II. During the 1980s, a neoliberal doctrine that emerged in the 
U.S.A. and the U.K. as Reaganomics and Thatcherism witnessed a declining 
state intervention in economic affairs. It preceded by tax cuts to lower 
government expenditures at the benefits of businesses.  
 
Under the influence of neo-liberalism the so-called the Washington Consensus 
has been built as a package of reforms to be transplanted in the former socialist 
countries upon transition from government controlled to market economy in the 
early 1990s. The implication of this reform package was that deteriorated 
performance of companies in former socialist economies exposed to competition 
of more experienced and technologically advanced Western companies.  
 
Economic liberalization alongside institutional disorganization and reorganization 
process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has led to the strengthening of 
individual and/or group interests and their opportunist behavior vis-à-vis weaker 
role of state in the economy. When individuals advance their interests, Adam 
Smith was convinced that they serve the interests of society, too. A coincidence 
of then individual behavior has been observed in the early transition in CEE with 
the rise of tycoons, though the difference is that tycoons mostly made 
themselves better off at the expense of society and aggregate economy in the 
short run.     7
In early transition and emerging democracies, patron-client relationships or 
clientelism between the rich and political establishment are often personalized. 
The rich first influence and then support those economic policies that help them 
further advance their private interests. Such a political reliance of the government 
and institutions on the few rich leads to underperformance of public goods 
supplied by the government to the rest of population (Keefer, 2005). The extent 
of clientelism is the factor contributing to the rise of sharp differences in 
economic welfare among the population in transition economies. In Russia, a 
group of powerful tycoons known as oligarchs came out with a large stake of 
resources to exercise sufficient control over politics and run institutions by proxy 
for their interests (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). Oligarchs who by definition 
mean the rule of few should be distinguished from tycoons. The tycoons may be 
very rich but may not necessarily exercise active and direct influence in politics.  
 
It would be wrong to assume equality in economic terms between the people in 
similar as well as different circumstances; there were and always will be 
differences. But the gap that arose during transition from communism to a market 
economy through dishonest and controversial ways has become subject to much 
research and criticism. In the course of resource redeployment, profitable 
opportunities of the few taking the largesse from existing wealth along with 
increase in poverty for the majority, were later assessed when democratic 
elections of majority of the votes corrected “their failures” by putting into power 
the parties with social democracy orientation, and in some cases “reformed” 
Communists (Stiglitz, 2002).   
 
The very diverse economic performance in transition economies encouraged the 
scholars to incorporate in their economic analyses non-economic factors such as 
cultural differences and institutions, by which it is aimed to explain economic 
growth or decline. In this respect, Roland (2004) refers to fast-moving institutions 
that are characterized by political changes, typical what happened after 
immediate collapse of the communist system and the multiparty political 
transition period in CEE, and slow-moving institutions related to the changes that 
are more gradual. An interaction between these two types of institutions affects 
economic performance and development differently. When institutional   8
transplantation or exporting the stock of knowledge and system of rules 
elsewhere failed to bring about economic prosperity (like in India under the 
British rule) Roland explained that as a cause of incompatible interaction 
between fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. The alternative to institutional 
transplantation that the economic reforms should be endogenously based or 
designed on local specific features in a globalizing world also cannot be 
supported. To some extent, the success of economic reforms depends on the 
level of accumulated knowledge, cultural factors and the peoples’ mentality in 
shaping institutions.  
 
Relative economic performance in transition has mostly been addressed to 
institutions that have managed it. A study by Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) 
that included twenty transition countries found that political stability was of 
primary importance for the performance of other institutions such as property 
rights security, reliable judicial system, and a lack of corruption, were all 
important for economic growth. A later study by Redek and Sušjan (2005) for 
twenty-four transition economies over the period 1995–2002, confirm that long-
term growth was more stable in the countries with better legal system, protection 
of property rights, plus stable financial system. The variation in overall economic 
performance is explained by institutional transformations and aggregate 
uncertainty during which there was a decline of output (Roland, 2002). Another 
explanation was that institutional building and development for economic growth, 
which also varied across countries, depended on several factors, e.g. years 
under socialism, civil wars, availability of natural resources, EU accession, speed 
of liberalization, and privatization. According to Beck and Leaven (2005), civil 
wars in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, Croatia and FYR 
Macedonia were found to have had negatively affected economic performance 
(as measured by economic growth and GDP per capita) only in the short run, 
after which sustainable development followed. Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
Kosovo is often compared with, has reached a sort of economic consolidation 
and nearly half of her imports are covered by exports (European Commission, 
2006). In Kosovo the oposite happened; the first two years after the 1999 war 
marked a significant rate of economic growth that was explained by foreign aid 
and the very low economic base. Now when the economy should have entered   9
the phase of sustainabe development, it went to a slump.  Instead of political 
economy and sound economic policies, politicization of the economy prevailed 
and is still at stake.  
 
Kosovo had a low level of accumulated knowledge and experience for 
democracy and transition to a market economy. What had been achieved during 
self-management socialism was reversed in the ‘90s under Serbia’s repressive 
rule by dismissing majority of Albanians from public administration and social 
sector. A decade lost in management of public administration would later result in 
inexperience and deficiencies of managing the transition. There was no longer 
any interest in self-management even from theoretical point of view and Kosovo 
Albanians perhaps wrongly associated that system with Serb domination.
4 The 
knowledge needed for democracy and economic transition was missing. Having 
this disadvantage into consideration, one would come to a conclusion that 
institutional transplantation would be more than welcomed to catch up with what 
was lost.  It actually happened.  
 
UNMIK and the PISGs are an example of fast-moving institutions. Their 
interaction between themselves and slow-moving institutions, i.e. Kosovo’s 
historical, social and cultural factors, help to explain many outcomes that can be 
classified as moderate successes and in largest part as failures, especially in 
economic front. Aside from ineffective criticism by various stakeholders outside 
fast-moving institutions or any subjective assessment to undermine the mission, 
only now we are finding the books like “How the World Failed Kosovo”, written by 
those who worked for UNMIK.
5 The authors of this book tried to partially show 
their honesty by reporting some of the failures in the mission they worked for. 
And they did so only after walking away with the sums of money that they would 
have not gotten in their home country for the entire working career.  
                                                 
4 The Serbs in turn have not shown any sympathy for self-management system on the eve of its 
collapse. When the Serb nationalism rose in the early 1990s, it used a propaganda to blackmail 
Slovenia for inventing self-management for the purpose of allegedly exploiting Serbia (Bennet, 
1995: 107).   
5 The full title of this account is: King, Ian and Whit Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World 
Failed Kosovo?, Crisis in World Politics 2 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). The first author 
has worked for UNMIK from April 2000 to December 2003 as head of planning. The second 
worked as public affairs officer for UNMIK from May 2002 to January 2004.      10
2. Kosovo’s economy as a property of the UN 
When UNMIK moved in, Kosovo’s economy was almost in ruins. The first 
challenging task for UNMIK was institution building in order to coordinate the 
postwar reconstruction through a massive international assistance. Legally, the 
UN is an organization that does not own anything in the countries in which it is 
deployed, except the facilities it rents for a certain time. As Kosovo in mid-June 
1999 was in chaos, it was necessary to establish a control over major remaining 
assets of the economy. It is worth referring to Article 6 of the Regulation No. 
1999/1 mentioned in previous section according to which UNMIK becomes a 
direct administrator of social and public property in Kosovo. UNMIK proceeded 
with the legal framework to establish the department of reconstruction, customs 
duties, central fiscal authority to collect taxes, banking and payment authority of 
Kosovo – BPK (a sort of central bank without the right to print money and 
regulate monetary policy), and department of trade and industry, or the basic 
institutions for functioning of the economy. Many of those institutions underwent 
significant changes and the powers were gradually transferred to the PISGs. For 
instance, department of reconstruction disappeared, central fiscal authority was 
transformed into the ministry of economy and finance, department of trade and 
industry was split into a ministry with the same name and the Kosovo Trust 
Agency (KTA).
6 Customs duties and BPK (recently this has been renamed as 
Central Banking Authority of Kosovo – CBAK) remained. Kosovo became the first 
country outside the EU zone to use Euro (€) as official currency.   
 
The final say on economic issues still rests with UNMIK. In some institutions such 
as the KTA, UNMIK excludes any possible important decisions by the PISG’s 
representatives.  Having major assets in strategic sectors under control through 
the KTA that is established with a mandate to privatize socially-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and restructure public companies, it can be argued that 
Kosovo’s economy is still like a property of the UN, irrespective of its interim 
mission. But that is not the magnitude of control to call the UN as (provisional) 
owner. The following sub-section provides additional details that makes it more 
like the economy of an EU mission.  
                                                 
6 For more details about the KTA visit http://kta-kosovo.org/html/.    11
2.1 Pillar IV and its mission in emerging transition  
UNMIK is still the administrator of Kosovo, which the Resolution 1244 recognizes 
as technically province of Serbia. The head of UMMIK is the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who is appointed by the UN’s 
Secretary General. In a simpler language, SRSG means the Governor of 
Kosovo. UNMIK exercises its administration through 4 Pillars in the following 
areas: Pillar I – police and justice (led by the UN); Pillar II – civil administration 
(also led by the UN); Pillar III – democratization and institution building (under the 
direction of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE); 
and Pillar IV – in charge of reconstruction and economic development (directed 
by the European Union).
7 The last pillar is of special importance not only for this 
paper but also for the future of Kosovo’s economy. 
 
After some two years of the UNMIK’s administration, the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo outlining the beginning of 
gradual transfer of powers from UNMIK to the PISGs was approved. The transfer 
of power in economic affairs does not include key decision-making areas that are 
earmarked as the “reserved power” for SRSG, whose authority is derived from 
the UN Resolution 1244. A list of areas falling under the reserved power for 
SRSG that is provided in section 8 of the Framework includes: approval of the 
Kosovo budget; monetary policy; controlling the UNMIK’s customs service; 
administration of social, state, and public property; appointing of members in 
economic and fiscal council; appointing of tax inspectors, etc.
8 
 
The mission of Pillar IV to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure is still 
underway. Major reconstruction has taken place ranging from impressive results 
at the Prishtina international airport which is made the busiest one in the Western 
Balkans, to electricity shortages in spite of huge investments through the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) worth hundreds of millions of Euros 
in the monopoly based Kosovo Electricity Company. Economic development is 
being supported through various programs financed by the EAR in the newly 
                                                 
7 UNMIK’s website is available at: http://www.unmikonline.org   
8 Provisions of UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9, amended by Regulation 2002/9, available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2002regs/RE2002_09.pdf    12
established private enterprises and privatization of SOEs. The process of 
privatization as one of the aspects of transition begun in mid-2003 and was 
expected to be formally completed by mid-2005 when the mandate of the KTA 
should have been terminated.
9 As of nearly three years after that deadline, the 
process is miles away from meeting that target, the KTA is still alive and has got 
much work to do in the coming years.  
 
3. How Kosovo’s unresolved political status impeded economic 
development? 
Pending political status in many ways has restricted Kosovo’s economic 
development. By not being politically independent and a recognized state, 
Kosovo still cannot access loans from international organizations such as the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance 
Corporation and many more, to finance large projects in infrastructure and 
facilitate economic development. Furthermore, it was constrained to reach and 
sign certain agreements with other countries until recently when UNMIK signed 
free trade agreements with Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Croatia. 
 
Although Kosovo is technically still part of Serbia and trade is supposed to be 
free,  Kosovo’s exports (and also imports) are charged with transit charges of 3% 
in Serbia and 5% in Montenegro, whereas Kosovo’s infrastructure is freely used 
by everyone (EU Pillar IV, 2004). These asymmetric trade relations are impeding 
greater economic cooperation and integration, which obviously is coming at 
Kosovo’s expense. Trade is also restricted because foreign countries, except 
FYR Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro do not recognize Kosovo’s number 
plates.  
 
Kosovo’s economic underdevelopment in terms of unresolved political status 
may be attributed to three major constraints: i) initiatives of the European Stability 
Pact sidestep Kosovo in many projects of regional development; ii)  the PISGs do 
not have the power to make major decisions regarding economic development; 
                                                 
9 On how the KTA underestimated the challenge of privatization, difficulties and uncertainties it 
faced in the process, see Mulaj (2005).    13
and iii) related to and within the previous constraint, there is a lack of 
transparency in the functioning of the PISGs (Perrit, 2004).
10 
 
Losses due to prolonged political status settlement are enormous. Entering into 
more details to explain them would beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
when the Government was constantly confronted with poor economic conditions, 
it blamed the unresolved political status with generalized statements; that this 
political status quo is impeding us to do this and that, once independence is 
recognized many doors will be opened, and alike. As political status begun to be 
dealt with, frustrations about poor economic conditions were caressed a little, 
and when it entered a more dynamic phase that resulted in the Proposal of Martti 
Ahtisaari, the attention to the economy again lost its importance.  At the time 
when the Proposal became public and the media were massively focusing on it, 
Sweden’s foreign minister, Carld Bild, paid a visit to Kosovo. To my surprise, as 
he said in a short interview with Radio and Television of Kosovo (RTK) on 1 
February, 2007 “the politicians here are underestimating the poor state of the 
economy. They are thinking that the economy will do fine after the political status 
is settled. It is not that easy as they are thinking. Tough challenges for the 
economy lie ahead”. 
 
3.1 Economic policies and management: too much blame on politics 
According to international methodology, Kosovo has got one of the most 
business friendly environments in South Eastern Europe (SEE). A study 
conducted by USAID (2005) on Business Conditions Index that uses the 
methodology of the World Bank’s Doing Business,
11 found that an average period 
to settle up a business in Kosovo is 23 days after 5 procedures being completed. 
This is much faster than in any other SEE country. The costs of starting a 
                                                 
10 Perrit also argued that the U.S.A. should push for Kosovo’s independence not only to facilitate 
Kosovo’s economic development, but given that Kosovo’s majority population is Muslim and 
secular with great sympathy towards the U.S.A., then it would help the U.S.A. to have more 
friendly relations with less friendly Muslim countries. He further added in favor of Kosovo’s 
independence that Yugoslavia (now disintegrated) means the land of southern Slavs and 
Albanians are not Slavs. 
11  There are seven components that are part of Business Conditions Index: 1) Starting a 
Business; 2) Hire/Fire of Workers; 3) Registering Property; 4) Access to Credit; 5) Protecting 
investors; 6) Enforcement of Contracts; 7) Closing a Business. More details about the survey can 
be found at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys    14
business are very low (5.5% of income per capita), even by international 
standards. The procedure of hiring and firing workers are very flexible, costs to 
register property are the second lowest in the region and the average time to 
close the business is the lowest comparing to other countries in SEE region. 
Areas where business environment lagged behind the region are related to 
property rights and underdevelopment of the banking system to act as a creditor 
to a business community. The study on business environment concluded that 
Kosovo has the necessary regulations in place, therefore recommended to the 
Government to focus on their implementation rather than passing additional 
regulations or amendments. Despite appropriate legal and regulatory framework 
to do business, development continues to be undermined by insufficient law 
enforcement and unreliable courts to resolve disputes. 
 
Trade regime consists of: i) 0% Value Added Tax (VAT) on exported goods (no 
customs duties); ii) a tariff rate of 10% charged at the border on imported goods 
(agriculture inputs are exempt; goods subject to excise taxes which have 
different higher rates or per value); iii) VAT of 15% as a border tax for imported 
goods. These tax rates do not apply to all countries that Kosovo has trade 
exchange with. Goods coming from Macedonia are not subject to customs duties 
at the border (only VAT is collected) except a charge of 1% of goods’ value 
collected in the name of customs’ fees. Border taxes in 2005 accounted for 68% 
of Kosovo’s budget revenues (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006), or much 
higher than in any transition country. The implication of such a budget 
composition in the medium term will be the rising trend of liberalization such as 
the entry into force of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) that 
will inevitably force Kosovo to rely more on taxes collected within the country to 
maintain budget sustainability. 
 
Agriculture is referred to as one the sectors that is in a more disadvantaged 
position than others and with potentials to development at the same time. The 
development of this sector is facing strong competition from countries in the 
region, where producers enjoy support from their government subsidies. Kosovo 
producers cannot afford this competition in an entirely open market. The price of 
local products is higher than of imported ones, often with dumping prices. The   15
budget of the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Rural Development is very 
small. In fact there is no budget for anything about agriculture – that is a budget 
for salaries and costs of the Ministry and not for any support or investment in 
agriculture. Limited and difficult access to finance features all businesses, but 
agribusinesses got only 2% of total loan portfolio from by the banks. Access to 
finance by agribusinesses could be improved through the loans from a 
commercial bank where the Government would subsidise the interest rate. 
 
An undesirable impact on the economy has been frequent changes in the 
Government and the split between political parties. Just one month after the 
death of former Kosovo president Ibrahim Rugova who was also the chairman of 
the largest political party – the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the 
Assembly Speaker Nexhat Daci (LDK), the Prime Minister (PM) Bajram Kosumi 
(from the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo – AAK) and his deputy Adem Salihaj 
(LDK) were dismissed overnight in the beginning of March 2006. The Assembly 
Speaker was dismissed by majority of votes in the Assembly of LDK-AAK 
coalition charges of misusing public funds, the PM who had inherited his position 
from the AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj was accused of being too inefficient and 
was forced to resign. Agim Ceku, who was the commander of Kosovo Protection 
Corps and politically unaffiliated, became PM as the member of AAK (UNDP, 
2006a).  In all this political turmoil that continues, economic issues are being 
neglected, whereas non-professionalism, inefficient and corrupted governance 
have associated the PISGs and local administration. The Office of the Auditor 
General found enormous irregularities in managing public finances, 
mismanagement of procurement policies, non-compliance with tender 
procedures, and use of money for other purpose than allocated.
12 The 
destination of some funds was found as money laundering and their use later 
discovered.
13  
                                                 
12 All reports of the Auditor General are available at: www.oag-ks.org.  
13 For example, the KTA in 2006 was forced to abolish the tender winner for an SOE (Jugoterm) 
in Gjilan city after it found that the deputy PM Lutfi Haziri and his political associates are behind 
the bid. Before becoming deputy PM, Mr. Haziri was mayor of Gjilan. The Auditor General found 
the Government had pledged €5.0 million of which €3.7 million were actually delivered to repair 
the damaged caused by an earthquake that struck the region in 2002. Only €1.25 million were 
spent for intended purpose whereas the destination of €2.45 million was unknown. See full report 
at:   16
The PISGs and UNMIK are an example of joint and dualist administration at the 
same time as there is no a clear cut line who is in charge to do what. The PISGs 
often complained that they do not have sufficient competencies to do more in 
certain economic areas. Their vociferous critique against UNMIK, Pillar IV 
respectively, is that the funds of privatization, Kosovo Pension and Savings Trust 
are frozen, then a part of Post and Telecommunication profit and banks’ deposits 
is being used abroad, which the PISGs rightly complain against it as a cause of 
economic recession by withdrawing the money from circulation. The main 
problem in this governance system between UNMIK and the PISGs is perhaps 
that some foreign countries have interests in strategic sectors, therefore are 
selective towards some clientelist local politicians (Domadenik, Mulaj, and 
Redek, 2006).  After all, some local and international stakeholders are interested 
to keep this system in operation for their benefits.  
 
4. Economic conditions and indicators  
Kosovo’s economy today is one of the poorest in Europe (more on poverty in 
forthcoming sub-section). With an estimated GDP per capita of €1,120 in 2005 
(International Monetary Fund – IMF, 2007) Kosovo ranked second lowest in 
Europe after Moldova where the related figure was $862 (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development – EBRD, 2006). GDP per capita fell to €1,117 
in 2006 and is estimated to fall to €1,114 in 2007 as a result of expected 
population growth from 2.033 million in 2006 to 2.067 million in 2007. GDP per 
capita is slightly more than 1/3 of that in the neighboring countries (Albania, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia).  
 
As indicators in Appendix to this paper show, Kosovo’a economy suffers from a 
considerable number of structural distortions and macroeconomic imbalances. 
Interesting enough, consumption as one of four components of GDP since 2001 
to the present day is higher than the GDP itself. Imports are several times higher 
than exports causing a very large trade deficit which currently is running at 
around 55% of GDP. In principle, consumption generates production and 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.oag-ks.org/Reports_ENG/AR2004EngGJILAN%20P-AM.PDF. On involvement of Lutfi 
Haziri in the privatization of Jugoterm and scanned documents of financial transactions through 
Kasabank, see Një privatizim që korruptoi gjysmën e kabinetit Çeku ( A privatization that 
corrupted half of [Agim] Ceku’s cabinet) available at: http://www.cohu.org/jugoterm.html.     17
production investment, which is not so much the case in Kosovo. Most 
consumption goods are largely imported, thus making Kosovo’s population as a 
consumption society, the money of which largely ends up abroad. The main 
source of financing this economic paradox is foreign assistance and remittances 
of Kosovar emigrants that encourage production and investment in the countries 
that export consumption goods to Kosovo (Mulaj, 2007). Workers’ remittances in 
2006 accounted for around 15% and donor assistance for over 17% of GDP. This 
implies that around 1/3 of Kosovo’s economy directly depends on abroad.  
 
The donor support, including UNMIK’s expenditures, has been declining year by 
year having a significant impact in the economy. The EU Pillar IV estimated that 
UNMIK has spent around €2.6 billion since it was established in mid-1999 to 
2006 (EU Pillar IV, 2006). The IMF (2007) assessed that UNMIK spent €280 
million in 2006 should have and is spending €224 million in 2007. That makes a 
cumulative of well over €3 billion that would have be sufficient to establish 
sustainable and efficient institutions of a small market economy like Kosovo.   
Beside this direct amount within UNMIK only, Zaremba (2007) notes that after 
eight years, a total €22 billion euros have been spent in Kosovo by the UN and 
international organizations in all aspects. The fact that this enormous amount has 
not resulted in economic consolidation and sustainability but produced fragile 
conditions presented earlier, in the view of Zaremba has one core explanation; 
Kosovo became the UN’s biggest money laundering mission in history where the 
UN’s bureaucrats and some local political mafia filled up their pockets.
14  
 
A large business activity is going on in informal sector. Private small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) which played an important role in economic growth and 
employment generation in other transition countries still cannot make any 
significant change in the economy of Kosovo. Their development is being 
disadvantaged by a number of barriers. It is worth referring to unfavorable loans 
                                                 
14 The journalist Maciej Zaremba of Sweden’s largest newspaper Dagens Nyheter (30 June, 
2007) who has referred to the UN administration as “UNMIKISTAN” and “a bizarre form of 
government”, addresses much of this phenomenon to the European countries in the following 
way: “ONCE UPON A  time the world was easier to understand. Italians were corrupt while 
Scandinavians stood for honesty. But in Kosovo, the Viking mafia is a concept that stands for 
Danish, Norwegian and Icelandic profiteers. And local Kosovans pray to Allah that some day the 
incorruptible Italians will catch them”.   18
from commercial banks involving an average yearly interest rate between 12% 
and 15%, small volume of loans, and short repayment period.   
 
Unemployment has been, is and will be the most pressing economic problem for 
Kosovo. Unemployment rate in 2006 stood at over 45% or up from around 35% 
in 2005. It is the highest one in Europe. The Government does not have any 
employment strategy for the large umber of unemployed, mostly unskilled for the 
labor market demands.  The legal framework on social policies such as health 
care and insurance created just in February 2007 is not yet implemented due to 
budget constraints (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).  
 
4.1 Widespread poverty, dissatisfaction and frustration are on the rise 
 
As a result of massive unemployment, poverty in Kosovo is widespread and 
deepening every year.  Economic growth which in 2007 is expected to be very 
small or unobservable, cannot stop the poverty from rising. The World Bank 
(2005) study that uses the data of 2002/2003 showed that around 37% of the 
population was living in poverty line consuming less than €1.42 and over 15% 
living in extreme (food) poverty of €0.93 consumption per adult per day.
15 In later 
estimates up to 2006, the World Bank (2007a) maintains that poverty in Kosovo 
has not risen and the explanation provided in another report (World Bank, 2007b) 
was because of a problem in data comparability between different samples and 
large margins of error.  The study on the other hand indicates that there were no 
any real changes in household welfares except a slight rise in income inequality.  
Certainly, the rise in food prices in 2007 has increased poverty. Group age over 
65 enjoy old aged pensions of only €40 per month (see Appendix), which when 
measured by €1.42 consumption per day, all of them fall in the category of 
poverty line if they do not have any other incomes. Perhaps the biggest poverty 
in Kosovo is the lack of human and economic reliable data that would enable 
better research and decision makings. There has been no population census for 
over a quarter of the century, the last one being carried out in 1981. For more 
                                                 
15 The Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household survey as a standard measure of 
poverty is usually expressed in USD, but at that time there was no any significant difference in 
exchange between USD and Euro, therefore the World Bank preferred to use Euro.    19
than two years, the Ministry of Public Services has been making preparations to 
register Kosovo’s population.  
 
UNDP’s quarterly Early Warning Reports, a measure of risk indicators, show that 
Kosovo’s general public is becoming more and more dissatisfied with the 
economic conditions. Over 76% of the respondents were “very dissatisfied” or 
“dissatisfied” with current economic trends compared to 73.3% sharing the same 
opinion in 2005. Confidence on UNMIK has dramatically dropped from over 60% 
in November 2002 to 31% in June 2007. Similarly, confidence for the PISGs 
dropped from over 75% to 36% over the same comparative period.  More 
respondents are able to protest due to economic than political reasons (55% 
versus 31%).
16 All these indicators have alerted, if not alarmed, UNMIK, the 
PISGs and international players that a major unrest with far reaching 
consequences is just around the corner, especially after ambiguities that the 
political status may not be resolved by the end of 2007. A Berlin based think tank 
European Stability Initiative – ESI (2006), identified the hopes for better 
economic future of Kosovo through emigration. It recommended that the 
resolution of Kosovo’s political status should be seen through enabling the 
unemployed youth to go to Western Europe and find temporary job like 
Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles. Bringing additional police from the EU to deal 
with frustrated and unemployed people will not improve anything; “migration may 
help”, ESI maintained. The population does not have alternatives of political 
reaction like other transition countries had, i.e. to bring into power social 
democrats, “reformed” Communists or any other political party which in Kosovo 
ideologically are not so diversified. In practice, political parties are more of lees 
the same that can be mostly addressed to the ideology of diversified 
opportunism. Democratic elections got an alternative choice anyway. The 
population largely boycotted the elections both at central and local level held on 
17 November 2007, where the turnaround recorded the lowest level at only 41%. 
The Government is established from the results of these minority votes.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Findings of the UNDP (2007) report are drawn from opinion poll of over 1,200 respondents over 
time.    20
4.2 Kosovo’s other forgotten statuses 
The media and their diversified profile play a very important role in a transition 
economy. Kosovo is not short of them but short of diversification. There are 10 
daily newspapers, half of which mostly report political news, the other half (also 
news agencies) containing between 6-10 pages called VIP to report what Paris 
Hilton, Nicole Kidman and other famous celebrities are doing. Public TV – RTK 
regularly broadcasts matches of the English Premier League. Much of the 
unemployed youth and students have become so addicted that it would not be a 
surprise for someone to find that Kosovo has more fans per capita of the English 
Premier League than does England. It certainly shows that the youth is able to 
adapt to modern trends but the trend offered to them is not the one from which 
they can benefit anything. Poor Kosovar football also does not benefit much 
either. The UN’s largest development agency and assistance provider – United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – is playing football in Kosovo. It has 
appointed a Kosovo born footballer Lorik Cana who plays as midfielder for 
Olimpique de Marseille and Albania’s national team, as UNDP’s ambassador to 
promote the battle against poverty in Kosovo.) UNDP and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) which often fund projects jointly, apply 
discrimination against development and never deal with respective complaints.
17 
Many funds of international organizations have gone through incompetent and 
bad research as a consequence of favoritism, clientelism, nepotism, outright 
discrimination, jalousie, and hostility against professionalism applied by local 
personnel. Neither UNDP’s hotline nor USAID’s Office of the Ombudsman and 
Inspector General have been committed to investigate complaints from Kosovo.
18  
                                                 
17 The author of this paper has submitted a complaint against UNDP’s mission in Kosovo to the 
UNDP’s headquarters in New York in December 2006 for discrimination in the selection process 
of a joint project of UNDP and USAID on Kosovo Early Warning System. The author was 
informed in advance by local employees of UNDP that your (i.e. my) application will not be taken 
into consideration at all, for the reasons as they stated, that I was trying to build a monopoly in 
this sector of research (Koha Ditore, 13 November, 2006). The UNDP’s hotline stated that there 
was no any intention to discriminate me except the desire to bring in new analysts, a desire that 
had no legal basis and was against the terms of reference. The investigation specialist of UNDP’s 
hotline said that the report is ready, but was never made neither public nor available to me.    
18 After my first complaint, I only got an answer from UNDP’s investigation specialist in New York 
stating that my complaint does not affect my future applications. I submitted two more 
applications for the same project, one as individual analyst and the other as project coordinator. 
Unlike in the first one where I was accused of trying to build a monopoly, local personnel at 
UNDP in Kosovo told me that I was not even short listed in the second application. I received no 
answer for the third application and submitted complaints for investigation to UNDP’s and 
USAID’s HQ in New York and Washington D.C. USAID’s Office of the Ombudsman once told me   21
If one is to ask a citizen of the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo to remember 
something nostalgic about the system of self-management socialism, the most 
likely answer they will provide is: that was the system of education and health. 
These are the two sectors where UNMIK has fully transferred the power to the 
PISGs. The situation in the health sector has deteriorated so much that 
emergency centre in the hospital of Pristina often does not have basic medicines 
for the patients and sutures to hold the skin of open wounds.    
 
Education that is seen as a way out of poverty has become a poverty in itself. 
There are currently not less than 30 private universities in Kosovo in Kosovo. 
They are to provide higher education in a country of over 2 million inhabitants, 
where about 50% of the population is under 25 years old, and where illiteracy 
rate is 6% (UNDP, 2006b). Now, compare it with the U.K. that has a population of 
60 million and 120 universities, excluding the availability of hundreds of million 
students across the world. Slovenia with approximately the same number of 
inhabitants like Kosovo has got four universities, all of them public. Most private 
universities in Kosovo have got some education for business, which in reality is 
the business of education, i.e. to collect higher fees from poor students than in 
public university.  
 
Internet cafes that spread like mushrooms in a forest after rainfall throughout 
Kosovo, manage to make profits largely by hosting the youth who play a violent 
game called “counter strike.” These and other examples of youth degeneration 
refute any claim of deeply corrupted institutions and academics that Kosovo’s 
best resource is her people, in particular the youth, which under present 
governance system it is not.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that I should submit complaints for this project (that USAID finances the largest part) to UNDP. 
The U.S. is very much interested to investigate who finances whom in Middle East and elsewhere 
in the world, but constantly turns a blind eye and deaf ear to the misuse of its funds and 
discrimination in Kosovo. Moreover, USAID’s Ombudsman and Inspector General have left 
USAID’s employees in Kosovo to pursue the practice of misconduct which, apart from 
discrimination in their projects, influence discrimination elsewhere. That may fit into what Stiglitz 
(2004) would describe as “the ideas America pushes abroad are markedly different from what it 
practices at home.”         22
5. From the UN to an EU mission: is interim mission turning permanent?  
Perhaps the first mistake with Kosovo was made in the UN Resolution 1244 not 
only in the text it contained, but also because it did specify a timeframe of the 
mission and what will happen to Kosovo, or was the UN administration interim as 
it was said, or is likely to become permanent as it appears? One way out or an 
exit strategy could be understood by the functions and the powers that UNMIK 
was exercising to be transferred to the Government of Kosovo. After status talks 
in Vienna and presenting of Ahtisaari’s Proposal, the UN wants to end that 
interim administration by transferring it to the EU. A question here arises: if 
Kosovo does not need an outside administration such as the UN or the EU, then 
can it go to independence on its own if it wants? The answer from what we 
observed in Kosovo’s politics and economy is, No.  
 
Ahtisaari was appointed as the UN’s Special Envoy for Kosovo, to mediate the 
talks between Kosovo and Serbia over the future of Kosovo. The talks started in 
early 2006 in Vienna and coordinated through the UN Office of the Special Envoy 
for Kosovo (UNOSEK), that includes the staff from NATO, the EU, and the U.S.A.  
Serbia is represented by her government, Kosovo by the Unity Team involving all 
government and opposition high ranking officials. A total of seven rounds of talks 




The Proposal came as a surprise with huge favors to the Kosovo Serbs and no 
mentioning of independence so much promised by Kosovo’s government, except 
giving Kosovo a new political identity and independence from Serbia, but 
monitored by the EU. It appears that the core objective of this Proposal is to get 
rid of major roadblock – the UN’s Resolution 1244 at any cost, by building other 
impediments. Even in its current content that offends the rights of the majority of 
population, is being opposed by Serbia and her traditional ally Russia, which 
threatened to use the veto in the UN’s Security Council against the Proposal. The 
EU, however, is on the way to send its mission and replace UNMIK.  
                                                 
19 The Proposal is available at: http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html    23
For the relevance of this article, the discussion will mainly consider the 
Proposal’s economic implications. It offers Kosovo the chance to have access 
and become member of international financial institutions. The International 
Civilian Representative (which is like SRSG but as a representative of the EU) 
will play a role in appointments in key economic positions. SOEs and public 
companies remain under the jurisdiction of the KTA and foreigners again will 
have major say. In the section on external debt, the Proposal says that Kosovo 
will assume its share of the external debt of the Republic of Serbia, but is silent 
about huge damages that Serbia caused Kosovo and the property stolen by 
Serbia’s during the violent rule. These provisions of Ahtisaari’s proposal dot not 
guarantee any economic perspective, and in general is a continuation of existing 
mission with a different name and similar role.   
 
An issue which in the Proposal is not directly related to the economy is 
decentralization on ethnic basis to create Serb municipalities and enclaves with 
direc ties to Belgrade.  This may have serious implications in limiting the 
movement of goods and services. From political perspective, it may very easy 
lead to partition of Kosovo. The Unity Team has not explained this risk to the 
population and was largely not transparent during the entire process of 
negotiations. What the Unity Appears to have been interested was fat salaries in 
the negotiation process paid by Kosovo’s poor budget. The only Kosovo group 
opposing Ahtisaari’s Proposal is the movement Vetvendosje (Albanian for Self-
determination), an organization gathering mainly the youth. Vetevendosje’s 
opposition to UNMIK rule, the PISGs and Ahtisaari’s Proposal is only through 
peaceful protests, for which the Unity Team does not care. The rest of the 
population is passive, short-sighted, does neither know what went and is going 
on, nor what may happen in a distant future.   
 
 
Conclusions and lessons learned  
Managing political and economic transition in Kosovo through the UN and 
institutional transplantation was obviously a better alternative than go it alone 
with enormous constraints, inexperience and limited resources. Arguments that 
what has already been accomplished in the economy is a bed of roses and must   24
be never compared to what might have happened without UNMIK presence, can 
be found days and nights. However, the alternatives within the existing mission 
for the resources spent would have had resulted in remarkably better socio-
economic conditions. Since we are not in a position to rerun the experiment 
elsewhere due to specificity of slow-moving institutions and the impact of cultural 
factors, it is useful to learn some useful lessons from the experience that involved 
trial and error.  
 
The UN mission in Kosovo did not have any carefully planned exit strategy in 
sight. That is why its mission is trapped. Transferring it to the EU does not mean 
that the mission is accomplished. Having into consideration the resources it 
involved, the mission failed to provide better and sustainable economic 
perspective for majority of the population. The drawbacks were and still are 
related to non-coordination, lack of transparency and accountability. Many UN 
and development agencies personnel would face punishment if they were to act 
in their home countries as they did in Kosovo.  Such a behavior is not their born 
habit; it is generated in Kosovo. The UN and EU in future should ensure that their 
envoys are more accountable to the headquarters. Imposing modern legal 
framework and rules in the countries where the mission is deployed, is fine. 
Better enforcement of them is what future UN and the EU mission should 
consider seriously. 
 
It should be reminded that UNMIK and the PISGs belong to different slow-moving 
institutions, therefore their work together was not easy, nor it will be easy under 
forthcoming EU mission. As fast-moving institutions, UNMIK and the PISGs are 
partially responsible for underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty in 
Kosovo. The rest of responsibility may be addressed to certain segments of the 
population for not pushing the changes when they are necessary, in particular 
the change in peoples’ mentality towards modern fast-moving institutions and 
their “excessive love and respect” for some countries that would be the first to 
recognize Kosovo’s formal political independence. The population is missing a 
strategic thinking to gradually build the true independence at base in cooperation 
with international partners, after which it would have less foreign presence and 
better relation with them.  A collective transformation in the way of thinking   25
should happen, regardless that it may take time. It is true that Kosovo Albanians 
learn from the past but do not learn lessons for the future. There is a growing 
consensus at home and among some foreign countries that political 
independence should have been declared and recognized immediately after the 
deployment of the UN for the purpose of having a better status today, and not 
delayed to become more uncertain for the future. By the same token, someone 
today may think that raising a loud voice against development agencies for the 
projects’ mismanagement and discrimination even in individual recruitments, is of 
less importance and urgency compared to other major issues, therefore let it go 
and resolve later. After some time, when the problem evolves into a system of 
operation, it is very easy to find out the consequences in economic development 
for not reacting earlier, like in the case of political status.  And this is what 
features many areas in Kosovo – non-reaction until the consequences are 
seriously felt.    
 
In current conditions of widespread unemployment, deep poverty, the youth 
without perspective, many fear that tensions that may have far reaching 
consequences are just around the corner. Although the NATO-lead 
peacekeeping force (KFOR) is not allowing this to happen for a moment, social 
problems, disappointment, and Serb enclaves blessed by Ahtisaari’s humiliating 
Proposal, will keep the situation fragile. 
The status that is not yet forgotten is the final political status, though this too, has 
become uncertain. Other statuses explored in this paper are not receiving due 
attention. If the EU is planning to commit more resources than it has so far, then 
it should spend them differently, and that is, invest in changing the behavior of 
Kosovo’s slow-moving institutions. Only this approach can make Kosovo more 
economically viable and sustainable in the long run. Continuing current attempts 
with similar management methodology may result in some economic 
development, but at the end of the day high costs are very hard to justify 
suboptimal results. The EU should remember that in Kosovo’s economic 











Population (in ‘000)  1,868 1,900 1,932 1,965 1,999 2,033 2,067
GDP 2,439 2,447 2,426 2,516 2,238  2,270 2,303
    Consumption  2,680 2,623 2,600 2,699 2,792 2,862 2,772
    Investment  661 603 572 591 583  666 793
    Government expenditures
  240 402 543 749 698 723 724
    Net Export (Exports- 
Imports) 
-901 -779 -746 -774 -1,136 -1,259 -1,262
¾ Exports  372 321 300 298 204  249 284
¾ Imports    1,273 1,100 1,046 1,072 1,340 1,508 1,546
GPD per capita (in €)  1,305 1,235 1,256 1,301 1,120 1,117 1,114
Workers’ remittances  317 341 341 341 281  318 410
Total budget  232 500 590 601 628  713 693
Foreign assistance  1,170 887 688 573 491  465 376
Employment rate (%)
c) 19.6 23.8 25.3 27.7 28.5  n.a. n.a.
Unemployment rate (%)
c) 57.1 55.0 49.7 39.7 41.4  n.a. n.a.
Population in poverty line (%)
c) 50.3 37.7 38.1 43.5 34.8  45.1 -
Population in extreme poverty 
(%)
c) 
11.9 15.4 13.9 12.4 12.7 16.7 -
















Basic pensions (in €, month)  - - - 40 40  40 40
* Estimated;  
** Projected; 
n.a. data not available or could not be obtained. 
Note: GDP variables C+I+G+(NX-I) do not add up the numbers of aggregate GDP due to methodology used by the IMF. Amounts in 
the variable Government expenditures (G) are spread in Consumption and Investment. Following this, C+I+ (NX-I) adds total GDP as 
presented by the IMF and shown in the table.   
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Sources:  
a)  IMF, Aide Memories of the IMF Staff Mission to Kosovo, April 20 to May 4, 2005, Washington D.C.: IMF, 2005.  
b)  IMF, Aide Memories of the IMF Staff Mission to Kosovo, February 19 – 27, 2007, Washington D.C.: IMF, 2007. 
c)  World Bank, Kosovo Poverty Assessment: Accelerating Inclusive Growth to Reduce Widespread Poverty, Vol. 1, Report No. 39737, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit of the World Bank, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2007a. 
d)  World Bank, Kosovo Poverty Assessment: Promoting Opportunity, Security, and Participation for All, Report No. 32378-XK, Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Unit of the World Bank, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005. 
e)  Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare – MLSW, Information on labor market in Kosovo - May 2006, Prishtina: MLSW – PISG, 2006. 
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